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In this paper we analyze whether central bank communication can facilitate the
understanding of key economic concepts. Using survey data for consumers and pro-
fessionals, we calculate how many of them have expectations consistent with the
Fisher Equation, the Taylor rule and the Phillips curve and test, by accounting
for three diﬀerent communication channels, whether central banks can inﬂuence
those. A substantial share of participants has expectations consistent with the
Fisher equation, followed by the Taylor rule and the Phillips curve. We show that
having theory-consistent expectations is beneﬁcial, as it improves the forecast ac-
curacy. Furthermore, consistency is time varying. Exploring this time variation,
we provide evidence that central bank communication as well as news on monetary
policy can facilitate the understanding of those concepts and thereby improve the
eﬃcacy of monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
If people have better knowledge of the economy, they can make better informed decisions.
Especially central banks argue that the eﬀectiveness of the transmission channel increases
if people have a sound understanding of monetary policy goals and strategies (see e.g.
Bernanke, 2007). In this paper, we try to infer the extent to which people have an
understanding of key economic concepts and whether policymakers can facilitate this
understanding. We apply the concept of theoretical consistency to evaluate how monetary
policy announcements are perceived and how they are factored into economic decision
making.
For this purpose, we look at macroeconomic expectations and assess whether they
are consistent with key economic concepts. We then evaluate whether having theory-
consistent expectations is beneﬁcial for consumers’ inﬂation forecasting accuracy and if
we can explain part of its variation by changes in central bank communication and mon-
etary news. This evaluation has considerable policy implications, as it tests to what
extent central banks can improve the understanding of monetary policy via their com-
munication and whether they have been successful in doing so. Over the last 20 years,
central banks around the world have increased their eﬀort in communicating to the gen-
eral public, reiterating its importance for guiding expectations of the public. Nevertheless,
it is not yet clear what should be the best way to conduct central bank communication.
Morris and Shin (2002, 2007) conjecture that too much information might even deteriorate
the understanding of monetary policy. While there is some evidence that communication
can help in predicting future interest rate changes with respect to professional forecast-
ers (see, e.g., Sturm and de Haan, 2011), there is as yet no evidence as to whether this
improvement is linked to a sound understanding of monetary policy. Sims (2010) argues
that while ﬁnancial market participants and professional forecasters are likely to be very
attentive to even the smallest change in the policy statement, the eﬀects may be very
diﬀerent regarding individuals. Consistent with this view, Blinder et al. (2008, p. 941)
argue: “Virtually all the research to date has focused on central bank communication with
the ﬁnancial markets. It may be time to pay some attention to communication with the
general public.”
Using the microdata from the Surveys of Consumers conducted by the University of
Michigan (henceforth MS) and the Survey of Professional Forecasters conducted by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (henceforth SPF), we evaluate how the changes
in the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) communication inﬂuence individual
consistency with a version of the “Fisher” equation applied to income expectations, the
Phillips curve, and the Taylor rule. Speciﬁcally, we test whether consumers’ expecta-
tions correctly distinguish between real and nominal expected income, implying consis-
tency with the Income Fisher equation. Regarding the Phillips curve, we analyze if con-
sumers use the short-run trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment for forecasting.
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Although this is an empirical relationship which might not be realized in every period,
the Phillips curve trade-oﬀ is embedded in many forecasting models for inﬂation (see, e.g.,
Stock and Watson, 2008 and Faust and Wright, 2013).1 Finally, we evaluate whether con-
sumers form expectations regarding interest rates, inﬂation, and unemployment (or the
output gap) in line with the Taylor rule. Similarly to our deﬁnition of consistency with
the Phillips curve, we have to be careful in identifying consistency with the Taylor rule.
Following Carvalho and Nechio (2014), we avoid endogeneity issues by excluding periods
with large monetary policy shocks, i.e., the period before 1987 and further exclude the
period where the correlation between borrowing rates and the federal funds rate dropped,
i.e., the zero lower bound (ZLB) period from 2008 onwards.2 Note that throughout the
paper, the term “consistent expectations” denotes consistent with an economic concept.
We consider three channels of central bank communication: the sender channel (central
bank announcements), the transmission channel (the volume of news in the media), and
the receiver channel (consumers’ reported perception of news). For the ﬁrst channel,
we look at milestones of changes in the FOMC’s communication strategy as identiﬁed
by Middeldorp (2011) and Bernanke (2007). For the latter two channels, we generate
a new dataset capturing media news in leading US newspapers, and use data provided
in the MS on perceived news. The use of perceived news can be motivated by theories
of rational inattention, where agents have limited information-processing capacity and
therefore cannot absorb all available information. There is empirical evidence that under
these circumstances, the media have a strong impact on the expectation formation of the
general public. For instance, Hamilton (2004) and Soroka (2006) report that the media
report more “bad”news than “good”news and that especially bad news may inﬂuence the
information set. Therefore, the media might potentially introduce a bias in this part of
the transmission channel, as especially consumers may be relatively more exposed to bad
news compared to good news.
While our focus is on consumers’ consistency, we also study professional forecasters,
which allows us to draw comparisons between the two groups and evaluate the importance
of diﬀerent transmission channels for central bank communication. Using the SPF brings
some additional advantages, as we beneﬁt from a longer panel dimension and the fact
that the interest rate question directly asks for quantitative forecasts of the policy rate.
Furthermore, we can account for the issue of nowcasting when deﬁning consistency, as the
1We furthermore check the extent to which demand and supply shocks aﬀect the propensity to form
consistent expectations and control for diﬀerent phases of the business cycle and movements in oil prices.
2Endogeneity issues may arise as monetary shocks where known to be larger before 1987 (Leeper et al.,
1996). Also, Judd and Rudebusch (1998) have argued that the Taylor rule became a better approximation
for monetary policy in the Greenspan era. Furthermore, as the MS asks for expectations on borrowing
rates and not for the federal funds rate, the link might be much weaker in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial
crisis when some interest rates hit the ZLB (Carvalho and Nechio, 2014). Note that for professional
forecasters, the ZLB period is included as the survey asks for the 3-month Treasury bill rate, which is
highly correlated with the federal funds rate also in the ZLB period.
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most recent GDP and inﬂation rate is unknown to the survey participants when making
one-year-ahead predictions.
Before proceeding with the analysis of communication eﬀects on the shares of con-
sistent expectations, we brieﬂy discuss the results for average levels of consistency. It is
not surprising that the highest share of consistent expectations for both consumers as
well as professionals is observed for the Fisher equation, as this is a fundamental rela-
tionship. There is, however, a big gap between consumers and professionals. While the
share of forecasts consistent with the Fisher equation is around 84% for professionals,
only half of the consumers have consistent expectations. Regarding the Taylor rule, the
average shares are very similar, as about half of the population of consumers as well as
professionals have consistent expectations. Regarding the Phillips curve, there are again
fewer consumers consistent than professionals, 34% to 51%. However, on average only
6% of consumers form theory-consistent expectations with respect to all three concepts
in a given period. At about 31%, this share is considerably higher for professionals. We
observe strong time-variation in consistency shares for both groups. Furthermore, we can
show that consistency on average improves the forecast accuracy of consumers relative to
professional forecasters, as it moves consumers’ quantitative inﬂation forecasts closer to
those by professionals.
Given the time-variation in consistency shares, we next ask whether central bank
communication can account for it. We ﬁnd that the continued steps towards a more
transparent monetary policy signiﬁcantly aﬀect the consistency of both consumers and
professionals. The most important events in the case of consumers, in terms of improve-
ments in consistency and the magnitude of the eﬀect, turn out to be the announcement of
changes in the target for the Federal Funds rate starting in February 1994, the introduc-
tion of the balance-of-risks statement in January 2000, and the introduction of the oﬃcial
inﬂation target in January 2012. Furthermore, for professional forecasters the introduc-
tion of the press conference after the FOMC meetings in April 2011 plays a particularly
important role.
News on monetary policy have a positive eﬀect on the probability of having consistent
expectations with the Taylor rule and the Fisher equation in the case of consumers. For
professionals, we ﬁnd an additional positive eﬀect of monetary-policy news on consistency
with the Phillips curve and a positive link also from news on the Federal Funds rate
on consistency with the Fisher equation. This indicates that the “transmission channel”
inﬂuences both consumers and professionals. Although our prior was that professionals’
consistency would be less aﬀected by media news than consumers’, it nevertheless seems
that there exists at least some correlation of professionals’ consistency with diﬀerent types
of news. These can be both positive and negative, suggesting that the media may both
clarify or bias the information set.
For consumers, we can additionally check for eﬀects of the “receiver channel”. The
results suggest that consumers’ consistency is generally negatively aﬀected by negative
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news observed about inﬂation, unemployment, and credit conditions, while positive news
yield increases in consistency. There is evidence that consumers overreact to negative
news, which might explain why suddenly fewer people have consistent expectations. Fur-
thermore, this hypothesis might also explain why the overall media eﬀect is smaller for
consumers than for professionals.
Our paper relates to the literature studying central bank communication practices.
Over recent decades, central banks have attached a lot of attention to various communi-
cation strategies aimed at explaining monetary policy decisions and guiding expectations
of professional forecasters as well as consumers. While, as pointed out by Blinder et al.
(2008), communication and transparency improves the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy,
there is no consensus on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy (see also
Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007). Communication strategies of the FOMC are studied in,
e.g., Middeldorp (2011) and Carlson et al. (2006). It has been shown, for instance, by
Hayo and Neuenkirch (2010) for the FOMC or Sturm and de Haan (2011) for the ECB
that communication can help predict the future interest rate decision.
The paper by Carvalho and Nechio (2014) is closely related to our analysis with respect
to the Taylor rule. The authors study consistency of expectations with the Taylor rule by
evaluating the fractions of answers within the cross-section of the MS that give consistent
interest rate expectations, given their answers to the questions on unemployment and
inﬂation. The results are then compared across demographic groups and to the SPF.
We design a complementary exercise to study the individual consistency with the Taylor
rule relationship, but extend their approach in various ways. Besides considering further
macroeconomic relations individually as well as jointly, we evaluate the eﬀects on forecast
accuracy and link consistency of expectations to monetary policy communication and
monetary news.3
There also exist a few recent papers that investigate whether professional forecast-
ers behave in line with macroeconomic concepts. Mitchell and Pearce (2010) test whether
Wall Street economists believe in Okun’s law and the Taylor rule. Pierdzioch et al. (2011),
Fendel et al. (2011a), and Fendel et al. (2011b) use the Consensus Economic Forecast poll
for the G-7 countries to estimate whether professional forecasters report point estimates
in line with a Phillips curve, the Taylor rule, or Okun’s law. Lastly, Ru¨lke (2012) inves-
tigates the behavior of professional forecasters for six Asian-Paciﬁc countries. Analyzing
theory-consistency, our paper also relates to the literature on the relationship between
macroeconomic literacy and economic forecasting, as studied by Blanchﬂower and Kelly
(2008), Armantier et al. (2011), and Burke and Manz (2011).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We describe our dataset and
the identiﬁcation method for expectations that are consistent with the Fisher Income
equation, the Phillips curve, and the Taylor rule in detail in section 2. Our results on
3We also diﬀer somewhat in the identiﬁcation strategy of the Taylor rule as discussed in section 2.2.
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central bank communication, news, and consistency are presented in section 3. Section 4
concludes.
2 Data and the Measurement of Consistent Expec-
tations
This section describes the datasets used in our analysis and the deﬁnitions for measuring
consistent expectations with an Income Fisher equation, the Phillips curve, and the Taylor
rule. Moreover, we discuss shares of consistency, implications of consistency for forecast
accuracy and issues regarding the identiﬁcation of consistency.
2.1 Data
For the analysis of consumers, we use the microdata of the University of Michigan Survey
of Consumers (MS), where each monthly cross-section gives a representative sample of
the U.S. population. Additionally, about 40% of each monthly sample are chosen to be
re-interviewed after six months, so that the survey contains a rotating panel dimension.
Note that we truncate quantitative inﬂation estimates to lie in the range from -5 to 30
to exclude any extreme forecasts.4 We include the whole cross-section in our analysis,
but generally restrict our time sample to start in August 1987 and for the analysis of the
Taylor rule to end in December 2007 (otherwise ending in September 2012). We start the
sample in August 1987 with the appointment of Greenspan as Fed chairman to exclude
the period with large monetary policy shocks beforehand. For the analysis of consistency
with respect to the Taylor rule and regarding all three relations jointly, we additionally
exclude the ZLB period from January 2008 onwards, since the MS asks for expectations
on borrowing rates, which were less correlated with the policy rate during this period.
Robustness of our results with respect to the ZLB period is checked in section 6.1.5
In addition to the survey questions on consumers’ expectations reviewed in the next
section, we use a number of sociodemographic characteristics from the MS as control
variables. Moreover, we use the answers to an open question [A6] asking consumers
whether they heard of any favorable or unfavorable changes in business conditions re-
cently: Consumers reporting news on high or low prices or inﬂation (news prices high
and news prices low) are assigned a value of 1 and 0 otherwise, and similarly on high or
4For further details on the MS, see http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu.
5As Carvalho and Nechio (2014) point out, there is a potential endogeneity and causality problem
when discussing the relationship among these forecasts. Households’ expectations might not reveal the
causal eﬀect of inﬂation and unemployment on interest rates as there exists a potential endogeneity due
to monetary policy shocks (i.e., departures from systematic interest rate policy), which was particularly
prevalent in the pre-Greenspan period before 1987m8. Additionally, the correlation between interest rates
at long maturities likely triggered with question [A11] and the 3-months Treasury Bill rate dropped from
0.8 to 0.35 during the ZLB period starting in 2008. Note that the correlation between both interest rates
had similarly low levels around 1995/6.
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low unemployment (news u high and news u low) and on tight or easy credit conditions
(news credit tight and news credit easy).
For the analysis of professionals’ consistency, we use data on professionals’ quantitative
macroeconomic expectations from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). The SPF
contains, inter alia, quarterly nowcasts as well as forecasts over the next 12 months on
inﬂation, unemployment, 3-months treasury bill rates, real and nominal GDP, and the
GDP deﬂator. We use data from 1987q4 to 2015q1 and the 12-months ahead forecast to
match the forecast horizon of the consumer data.
In addition, we include a number of macroeconomic variables as explanatory variables
in the analysis. These include the CPI inﬂation rate (π) and its volatility (σ2π) measured
as the sum of squared inﬂation changes over the previous six months. We also include data
on year-on-year oil price growth (oil) as well as a the short-run unemployment gap (ugap)
as provided by the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO) as a measure of the business cycle
phase. All macroeconomic data are obtained from the FRED database of the St. Louis
Federal Reserve.
To evaluate the eﬀects of changes in the monetary policy communication strategy on
consumers’ ability to form consistent macroeconomic expectations, we construct, follow-
ing Middeldorp (2011) and Bernanke (2007), dummy variables representing important
milestones on the path to more communication and greater transparency. In particu-
lar, we control for the announcing changes in the federal funds rate target beginning
in February 1994 (FFTarget94t), the practice of issuing a “balance-of-risks” statement
along with the policy decision in January 2000 (BalanceofRisk00t), the inclusion of votes
with name(s) of dissenters in the statement in March 2002 (V otes02t), providing forward
guidance by explicitly indicating the likely direction of rates over an extended period in
August 2003 (ForwardGuidance03t), adding the Chairman’s press conference to the re-
lease of projections in April 2011 (PressConference11t), and ﬁnally including an explicit
inﬂation target of 2% in January 2012 (ExplicitTarget12t). Note that all communication
dummies take on the value of 1 at the month of the introduction of the measure and all
subsequent months, so that the coeﬃcients measure the additional eﬀect of this particular
communication measures relative to the ones introduced previously.6
To further study the eﬀects of changes in the monetary policy communication strategy,
we compute indices of media reporting in the spirit of Carroll (2003). More media report-
ing should imply that people are better informed and produce more consistent forecasts.
While Carroll (2003) computes a yearly index of the intensity of news coverage regarding
inﬂation in the New York Times and theWashington Post, we extend his approach to com-
pute monthly indices for news on inﬂation (media π), unemployment (media u), federal
funds rates (media FFR), and monetary policy more generally (media monetarypolicy).
6The reason for this choice is that we believe that the introduction of a speciﬁc milestone has a
permanent eﬀect on the understanding of monetary policy and not only a temporarily one. Hence we
refrain from looking at speciﬁc events and the immediate response.
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These indices are based on a search of each of the two newspapers for related articles,
converted into indices by dividing the number of articles on a particular topic by the total
number of articles. For the regression analysis, we use moving averages of the last three
months.7
2.2 Measuring the Consistency of Macroeconomic Expectations
We start our analysis by checking whether individual consumers correctly distinguish
between real and nominal values. This concept may be derived in the form of the Fisher
equation, which describes the relation between nominal and real interest rates. Assuming
that a bond earns a nominal return of it in the next period, its real return rt must be
depreciated with next period’s expected inﬂation πet :
rt ≈ it − πet . (1)
The Fisher equation gives the relation between real and nominal values and thus allows
us to test also for money illusion.8 Since the MS does not include any question about
real interest rates, we apply the concept of the Fisher equation to consumers’ real and
nominal income expectations instead. We thus assume that since income expectations
concern households’ monetary income in the future, their real value should be depreciated
with expected inﬂation similar to bonds’ returns in the Fisher equation. We label this
relation the “Income Fisher equation”:
rincet ≈ incet − πet , (2)
where rincet and inc
e
t denote consumers’ real and nominal income expectations, respec-
tively. The MS asks consumers to provide quantitative estimates for both expected inﬂa-
tion and expected nominal income in the next 12 months:
A15a “By about what percent do you expect your (family) income to (increase/decrease)
during the next 12 months?”
A12b “By about what percent do you expect prices to go (up/down) on the average, during
the next 12 months?”
From these two measures, we construct the implied quantitative real income expectations
by subtracting individual inﬂation expectations from individual nominal income expecta-
tions. To evaluate the consistency of implied real income expectations, we compare the
7Using the moving average helps to aggregate the overall tone of the news reported and furthermore
allows a better comparison to the perceived news question used in the survey, which asks about the news
heard recently.
8Money illusion is a term coined by Irving Fisher which refers to a tendency to think in terms of
nominal rather than real monetary values. As a consequence, people behave diﬀerently when the same
objective situation is represented in nominal or in real terms (Fehr and Tyran, 2001).
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quantitative estimate that would be consistent with the Income Fisher equation to the
qualitative answer to the survey question for real income expectations:
A14 “During the next year or two, do you expect that your (family) income will go up
more than prices will go up, about the same, or less than prices will go up?”
We deﬁne expectations as being consistent with the Income Fisher equation if the direction
of consumers’ qualitative real income expectations coincides with the sign of their implied
quantitative real income expectations. Hence, if consumers report “income goes up more
than prices”, they should report nominal price and income expectations which result in
positive real income expectations and vice versa.9 Table 1 shows the shares of consumers’
answers that are consistent with our deﬁnition of the Income Fisher equation marked in
bold. Out of nine possible answer combinations, three are deﬁned as being consistent,
which gives us an unconditional probability of being consistent of 33%. Note that in Table
1 we observe more mass of answers below than above the diagonal, suggesting that more
consumers expect negative developments in their real income, while giving estimates for
nominal income and inﬂation resulting in positive real income. This suggests that more
consumers are overly pessimistic about their real income prospects, which could imply
problems with money illusion. The overall share of consistent expectations together with
a test against the unconditional probability is shown for all three relations in Table 5
below.
Table 1: Income Fisher equation: Explicit and Implicit Real Income Expectations
REAL INCOME UP/DOWN (NOMINAL INCOME-PRICES) NEXT YEAR
NEXT YEAR Up Same Down Total
Go up more than prices 41% 8% 5% 20%
20,848 1,331 3,116 25,295
Go up same as prices 43% 62% 37% 43%
22,022 10,046 22,621 54,689
Go up less than prices 15% 30% 58% 37%
7,818 4,903 34,901 47,622
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
50,688 16,280 60,638 127,606
Notes: The time sample is 1987m8-2012m9. Number of respondents and column frequencies
are reported. Consistent fractions are marked in bold.
Note that a small caveat applies: The horizon of the qualitative real income question
includes the next 12 months as in the quantitative questions, but also the year after that.
Nevertheless, we argue that it is unlikely that consumers expect such large variations
9Our test for consistency with the Income Fisher equation implicitly assumes that consumers’ inﬂation
and nominal income distributions are distributed in such a way that their joint distribution is in line with
the implication of the individual distributions. Consequently, this assumption does not account for
asymmetric loss functions regarding expected real income.
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in real income over two years, that they might for instance have positive real income
expectations over the next 12 months, but expect a drop in their real income over the
next 1-2 years.10
Next, we evaluate if consumers have a Phillips curve trade-oﬀ in mind when forming
expectations on inﬂation and unemployment. This trade-oﬀ is embedded in most inﬂation
forecasting models, see, for instance, Stock and Watson (2008), Dotsey et al. (2011), as
well as Faust and Wright (2013). The original Phillips curve proposed as an empirical
relation by Phillips (1958) and Samuelson and Solow (1960) asserts a negative correlation
between wage growth, or the general inﬂation rate πt (assuming that prices grow in line
with wages, adjusted for productivity growth), and the rate of unemployment ut. Taking







Although the Phillips curve may be non-linear, with a smaller slope at low inﬂation rates,
the trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and unemployment is generally assumed to hold at least in
the short run. Note that we deﬁne the trade-oﬀ to be satisﬁed also if both inﬂation and
unemployment stay constant.11
For unemployment expectations, the MS includes a qualitative question, while for
inﬂation expectations we use both a quantitative and a qualitative question:
A10 “How about people out of work during the coming 12 months – do you think that
there will be more unemployment than now, about the same, or less?”
A12 “During the next 12 months, do you think that prices in general will go up, (go up
at the same rate), go down, or stay where they are now?”
A12b “By about what percent do you expect prices to go up/down on the average during
the next 12 months?”
As the above two questions on expected inﬂation are posed regarding changes in prices, we
need to redeﬁne them in terms of changes in inﬂation. Thus, following Carvalho and Nechio
(2014), positive changes in expected inﬂation are deﬁned as an expected increase of in-
ﬂation stated in [A12b] above the average inﬂation in the last 12 months rounded to the
nearest integer and vice versa for negative changes. Consumers giving point estimates
equal to average rounded past inﬂation are coded as expecting no change in inﬂation.
Additionally, we extend the approach of Carvalho and Nechio (2014) and use information
about perceived inﬂation, which we obtain for those respondents that answered in the
qualitative question [A12] that prices will increase at the same rate or stay where they
are now. We characterize them as expecting no change in inﬂation.
10Note that this argument is consistent with the law of iterated expectations.
11The empirical papers testing the Phillips curve trade-oﬀ for professional forecasters employ a similar
deﬁnition (Pierdzioch et al. 2011, Fendel et al., 2011a; and Fendel et al., 2011b).
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Consumers’ expectations are then deﬁned as being consistent with the Phillips curve
if consumers expect inﬂation to increase and unemployment to decrease and vice versa.
They are also consistent if they expect no changes in both inﬂation or unemployment.12
Table 2 presents the fractions of answers consistent with the Phillips curve trade-oﬀ, where
the unconditional probability of being consistent is again 33%. Note that consumers seem
to have a prior for expecting positive changes in inﬂation regardless of their unemploy-
ment expectations, so that the trade-oﬀ is less often incorporated into their expectation
formation when they expect unemployment to increase. Among those classiﬁed as consis-
tent with the Phillips curve, on average about 68% expect no change in either inﬂation
or unemployment, while about 32% incorporate the trade-oﬀ in either direction.
Table 2: Phillips curve: Inﬂation and Unemployment Expectations
INFLATION UP/DOWN UNEMPLOYMENT MORE/LESS NEXT YEAR
NEXT YEAR Less About the same More Total
Go down 19% 19% 17% 19%
3,731 13,072 7,938 24,741
Stay the same 49% 45% 36% 43%
9,846 30,691 16,406 56,943
Go up 32% 35% 47% 39%
6,421 23,880 21,177 51,478
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
19,998 67,643 45,521 133,162
Notes: The time sample is 1987m8-2012m9. Number of respondents and column frequencies
are reported. Consistent fractions are marked in bold.
Finally, we analyze whether consumers form interest rate expectations in line with the
Taylor rule, that is, whether they are aware of the dual mandate of the Fed regarding
price stability and high employment. The Taylor rule was formalized from past empirical
observations of the Fed’s monetary policy by Taylor (1993).
If a central bank follows a forward-looking Taylor rule, it sets interest rates with
respect to deviations of expected inﬂation from the target level (πet −π∗) and the expected
unemployment rate uet . Hence, a central bank will increase interest rates if it expects either






t) = γ + α(π
e
t − π∗) + βuet with α > 1, β < 0 (4)
If, furthermore, central banks apply interest rate smoothing, consumers should not
only expect a one time change in interest rates, but several consecutive interest rate
12We check for robustness of our results with respect to alternative deﬁnitions of consumers’ inﬂation
expectations; see Figure A.1 in the Appendix.
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movements. Hence, for instance, an increase in expected inﬂation should lead to expected
higher interest rates.
We measure consumers’ inﬂation and unemployment expectations as explained above
for the deﬁnition of consistency with the Phillips curve.13 For interest rates, we use the
MS’s qualitative question on nominal interest rates, which reads as follows:
A11 “No one can say for sure, but what do you think will happen to interest rates for
borrowing money during the next 12 months – will they go up, stay the same, or go
down?”
We thus code consumers’ expectations as being in line with the Taylor rule if respondents
report that they expect rising interest rates, as well as increasing prices and falling unem-
ployment. Furthermore, interest rate expectations are also consistent with the Taylor rule
if consumers expect rising (or constant) interest rates with either rising price expectations
or falling unemployment expectations, while the other variable is expected to remain con-
stant. The same rules apply to expectations regarding falling interest rate expectations.
Finally, if interest rates are expected to remain constant, both prices and unemployment
must also be expected to stay the same.
Table 3: Taylor rule I: Interest Rate and Inﬂation Expectations
INTEREST RATES UP/ INFLATION UP/DOWN NEXT YEAR
DOWN NEXT YEAR Go down Stay the same Go up Total
Go down 14% 17% 10% 14%
3,173 8,047 3,813 15,033
Stay the same 27% 35% 23% 29%
5,921 16,496 8,793 31,210
Go up 59% 48% 67% 57%
12,860 22,827 25,857 61,544
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
21,954 47,370 38,463 107,787
Notes: The time sample is 1987m8-2007m12. Number of respondents and column frequencies
are reported. Consistent fractions are marked in bold and are conditional on consistent
answers to the unemployment question.
Tables 3 and 4 show the fractions of answers to interest rate expectations, inﬂation,
and unemployment expectations that would be consistent with a Taylor rule relation-
ship, where each Table is conditional on the answer to either unemployment or inﬂation
expectations, respectively. The unconditional probability of being consistent given all
possible answer combinations is 41.23%. Note from Tables 3 and 4 that consumers have
13Additionally, we check for robustness of our results with respect to an alternative deﬁnition of con-
sistency with the Taylor rule which attempts to account for the role of the (possibly implicit) inﬂation
target in equation (4), shown in Figure A.2 in the Appendix.
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Table 4: Taylor rule II: Interest Rate and Unemployment Expectations
INTEREST RATES UP/ UNEMPLOYMENT MORE/LESS NEXT YEAR
DOWN NEXT YEAR Less About the same More Total
Go down 14% 12% 18% 15%
2,472 7,578 7,261 17,311
Stay the same 30% 31% 24% 29%
5,214 19,150 9,870 34,234
Go up 56% 56% 58% 57%
9,657 34,100 24,022 67,779
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
17,343 60,828 41,153 119,324
Notes: The time sample is 1987m8-2007m12. Number of respondents and column frequencies
are reported. Consistent fractions are marked in bold and are conditional on consistent
answers to the inﬂation question.
more diﬃculties in giving consistent expectations when interest rates would be expected
to decrease.14
Table 5: Shares of Consumers with Consistent Expectations
Mean Median SD Min Max N Uncond. T-test
Prob.
Fisher equation 0.52 0.51 0.04 0.41 0.64 152,041 0.33 78.196***
Phillips curve 0.34 0.34 0.05 0.16 0.44 152,041 0.33 1.736*
Taylor Rule 0.46 0.46 0.06 0.29 0.61 123,324 0.41 11.606***
All Relations 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.12 123,324 0.046 13.612***
Notes: The time sample is 1987m8-2012m9 for the Fisher equation and the Phillips curve and
1987m8-2007m12 for the Taylor rule and all three relations jointly. The last column tests whether
the mean is diﬀerent from the unconditional probability of having theory-consistent expectations
in the MS with a one-sample t-test. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 1/5/10% level.
Table 5 gives the summary statistics of the shares of consumers with expectations con-
sistent with the Income Fisher equation, the Phillips curve, the Taylor rule, and all three
relations jointly and tests the average consistency shares against the unconditional prob-
abilities derived from Tables 1-4. On average, about 52% of consumers form expectations
consistent with an Income Fisher equation, which is signiﬁcantly higher than the uncon-
ditional probability of one third. About 34% of consumers in our sample are consistent
with the Phillips curve trade-oﬀ on average, while 46% incorporate the Taylor rule rela-
tion in their expectations. While both of these mean shares are statistically higher than
the respective unconditional probability, it should be noted that the diﬀerence regard-
ing the Phillips curve is probably not economically signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, we observe
systematic movements in consistency with the Phillips curve across the business cycle,
14This is in line with the ﬁndings in Baghestani and Kherﬁ (2008).
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as discussed in the next section, which suggests that answers are not random. Finally,
on average about 6% of consumers are consistent with all three macroeconomic relations,
which is again statistically higher than the unconditional probability of 4.6%.
2.3 Characteristics of Consistent Expectations
In this section, we evaluate over time the shares of consumers with expectations consistent
with the Income Fisher equation, the Phillips curve, the Taylor rule, and all three relations
jointly. Figure 1 shows the shares of consistent expectations, starting in the Greenspan-
period in August 1987, where we do not interpret consistency with respect to the Taylor
rule and all relations during the ZLB period from January 2008 onwards.
We observe that the share of consumers with expectations consistent with an Income
Fisher equation stays relatively constant around its mean value of 52%. Consistency
shares for the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule show more pronounced time-variation,
especially regarding consistency with the Taylor rule and, hence, also regarding all rela-
tions jointly. For both the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule, Figure 1 suggests a drop
in consistency during the beginning of NBER recessions, where the subsequent rise in
consistency starts already during the recession. Note that this drop is particularly pro-
nounced during the recent Great Recession, which we exclude from our analysis of the
Taylor rule. Additionally, it can be shown that the relative share of consumers actually
incorporating the Phillips curve trade-oﬀ, rather than expecting no change in either in-
ﬂation or unemployment, becomes larger during periods of high macroeconomic volatility
such as recessions.15
In the Appendix, we also evaluate the shares of consistent expectations across demo-
graphic groups (Tables A.3-A.6). Generally, we observe similar patterns as those observed
in the literature regarding inﬂation forecast accuracy across demographic groups, where
consistency is higher for men and increases with both education and income.16 Note that
these patterns are most pronounced in the case of consistency with the Income Fisher
equation. Variations across age groups are less clear-cut and we observe almost no sys-
tematic variation in consistency across diﬀerent regions of the US.17
Next, we check whether consistency is related to consumers’ forecast accuracy regard-
ing inﬂation one year ahead, building on the analysis in Ang et al. (2007). In addition to
15Note that the shares of consumers consistent with the Phillips curve under random walk expectations
(π, u) and those incorporating the Phillips curve trade-oﬀ move in opposite directions over the business
cycle. Hence, we observe a relatively high share of random-walk expectations during stable periods,
whereas non-random-walk expectations become relatively more prominent during recessions and when
macroeconomic volatility is high. The correlation coeﬃcient of the two fractions of consistency regarding
the Phillips curve is -0.5. Results are shown in Figure A.3 in the Appendix.
16See, for example, Jonung (1981), Bryan and Venkatu (2001), Pfajfar and Santoro (2009), and
Anderson et al. (2010).
17While we have shown that the shares of consistent consumers vary over time and across demographic
groups, it is also possible to show that consumers forming consistent expectations in the ﬁrst interview
have a higher likelihood of being consistent in the second interview, compared to their counterparts
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Note: Graphs present the shares of consumers with consistent expectations, together with a polynomial
trend. Shaded areas denote recession periods as deﬁned by the NBER.
our ﬁnding of consistency shares above the unconditional probabilities, a relation between
consistency and forecast accuracy provides further structure and meaningfulness to our
concept of consistency. We thus evaluate the distance of the absolute inﬂation forecast
errors (AFEs) of consistent and non-consistent forecasts to the AFEs of professional fore-
casters in the SPF, shown in Figure 2 with summary statistics in Table 6. As the diﬀerence
approaches zero, consumers’ forecast accuracy regarding inﬂation approaches that of the
SPF. A positive diﬀerence means that consumers have higher AFEs than professional
forecasters, while a negative diﬀerence means that consumers beat the SPF forecast on
average. As one would expect, in most periods consumers’ AFEs are higher than the
SPF errors for both consistent and non-consistent consumers. However, we observe espe-
cially for the Phillips curve and consistency regarding all three relations that consistent
consumers are frequently closer to the SPF forecast than the non-consistent group. This
suggests that our results regarding consistency with the Phillips curve are economically
signiﬁcant, even if the diﬀerence in the average share from the unconditional probability
is not.
As shown in Table 6, consumers with expectations consistent with the Income Fisher
equation produce AFEs that are 1.98 inﬂation points higher than those in the SPF, while
15
Figure 2: Consistent and Non-Consistent Inﬂation AFEs of Consumers vs. the Inﬂation
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Note: Black lines denote diﬀerences in inﬂation AFEs of consistent consumers, red dotted lines denote
diﬀerences in inﬂation AFEs of non-consistent consumers.
AFEs from forecasts consistent with the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule are 1.38 and
1.89 points higher, respectively. Moreover, consumers with consistent expectations are
consistently better able to match the SPF forecast accuracy than their non-consistent
counterparts, except in the case of consistency with the Income Fisher equation. These
diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant in almost all cases, meaning that consistency with
economic concepts on average moves consumers’ inﬂation forecasts closer to professionals’
estimates.
2.4 Endogeneity, Causality, and Identification
This section focuses on potential issues with the identiﬁcation of the Phillips curve and
the Taylor rule. We start by assessing whether the Taylor rule or the Phillips curve was
realized in the actual data in any given period of time and how this compares to the
share of people with beliefs consistent with those theories. Even though, for instance, the
Phillips curve trade-oﬀ may not always be realized in empirical data, several authors argue
that, irrespective of its existence, incorporating a Phillips curve relationship improves the
16
accuracy of forecasting models.18 With respect to consistency regarding the Taylor rule,
we have to keep in mind that inconsistency could still imply consistent beliefs about the
actual conduct of monetary policy, since the central bank may deviate from an implicit
Taylor rule. In Figure 3, we thus show the share of consumers consistent with the Phillips
curve and the Taylor rule together with those periods where either the Phillips curve
trade-oﬀ or the Taylor rule relationship were not realized 12 months ahead in actual
macroeconomic data rounded to the nearest integer. Shaded periods denote months were
the relation was not realized in the previous three months. We observe that both relations
were satisﬁed also by actual macroeconomic data in most periods of our sample and that
the likelihood of forming consistent expectations with the Phillips curve and Taylor rule
increases when relationships are realized in reality.19 The Phillips curve trade-oﬀ was not
realized for a longer time-span during the mid-90s and in the years prior to and after
the recent ﬁnancial crisis, but this does not seem to have aﬀected the general trend in
consistency.
Additionally, consistency especially with the Phillips curve might depend on the ex-
istence of speciﬁc shocks. As Carlstrom and Fuerst (2008) point out, especially mark-up
shocks might be problematic, as they could lead to eﬀects on output and inﬂation that
are not consistent with the short-run Phillips curve correlations. Consequently, we check
for the role of supply and demand shocks, as predominant supply shocks would shift the
Phillips curve so that inﬂation and unemployment would in fact be expected to move in
the same direction. The potential importance of supply shocks for the identiﬁcation of
consistency with the Phillips curve is evaluated in Figure 4. We obtain data on both de-
mand and supply shocks from Kilian (2009), who extracts the shocks from a VAR model
of the crude oil market.20 In Figure 4, we then plot the share of consumers consistent
with the Phillips curve trade-oﬀ against periods with predominant supply shocks, i.e.,
periods where supply shocks in the last three months are larger than demand shocks in
absolute terms. In these periods, the Phillips curve would shift and the trade-oﬀ would be
assumed not to hold. This seems to be the case in only a small number of periods of our
sample, suggesting that the existence of supply shocks does not pose a major problem for
our identiﬁcation of consistency. Nevertheless, as expected, we observe that consistency
regarding the Phillips curve drops around 1988-89, around 1992-93 and around 2001 when
supply shocks dominated demand shocks. To control for some of these eﬀects, we include
18Comparing diﬀerent methods of forecasting, Stock and Watson (2008), Dotsey et al. (2011), as well
as Faust and Wright (2013) show that forecasting methods based on the Phillips curve were frequently
outperformed by survey forecasts and univariate methods, especially during the Great Moderation years.
Nevertheless, Phillips curve forecasts can perform relatively better especially during recessions and when
inﬂation is relatively volatile, pointing towards potential non-linearities and a role of the trade-oﬀ espe-
cially for forecasting turning points in inﬂation.
19Over the sample period, the Phillips curve was realized in the last three months in approximately
60% of the periods, while the same was true for the Taylor rule in 73% of the periods.
20Note that the time series in Kilian (2009) run only until 2007m12.
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(b) Taylor Rule and Non-Realizations in the Data
Note: (a) Shaded areas denote periods where the Phillips curve trade-oﬀ, using actual data rounded to
the nearest integer, was not realized 12 months ahead during the previous three months (b) Shaded areas
denote periods where future changes 12 months ahead of the Federal Funds rate, the inﬂation rate, and
the unemployment rate, rounded to the nearest integer, were not in line with a Taylor rule during the
previous three months.
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Share consistent with the Phillips curve
Note: Shaded areas denote periods with predominant supply shocks during the previous three months,
which are identiﬁed as those months where supply shocks are larger than demand shocks in absolute
terms. Data for demand and supply shocks is obtained from Kilian (2009), where the sample ends in
2007m12.
lagged oil prices as a control variable in the regressions of the next sections and conduct
further robustness checks in section 6.1.
Carvalho and Nechio (2014) study in detail potential endogeneity and causality for the
case of the Taylor rule. First, they point out that as long as the signs of the relationships
between inﬂation and interest rates, and unemployment and interest rates remain unaf-
fected by the endogeneity bias, the results regarding the consistency will be unchanged.
This holds because both Carvalho and Nechio (2014) and our study rely on the signs of
the relationships and not the magnitude of the eﬀects. Second, they show that monetary
policy shocks that could potentially cause endogeneity problems are relatively small after
1987 by estimating a variant of the new Keynesian model of Gal´ı et al. (2011) with two
diﬀerent Taylor rules. In fact, monetary policy shocks explain about 7.6% of the vari-
ance of inﬂation and 6.5% of the variance of unemployment for the speciﬁcation with an
inertial Taylor rule. They proceed with an exercise where they apply their procedure to
deﬁne consistency to the simulated data. Comparing results with estimated monetary
policy shocks and a version that uses an increased variance of monetary policy shocks,
they show that their inference might become invalid only if monetary policy shocks were
excessively volatile. Only with a variance of the shock at least four times larger than their
estimate the unemployment eﬀect results in a wrong sign.
19
Finally, Carvalho and Nechio (2014) also quantitatively address the concern about a
potential comovement of expected inﬂation and interest rate changes which does not nec-
essarily reﬂect expectations formed consistent with the Taylor rule. In particular, they
identify periods where the Fed deviated from the Taylor rule (August 2003–December
2005) and monitor the response of consumers. Consistent with the idea that households’
responses reﬂect their perceptions of monetary policy, the share of consistent expecta-
tions should be lower during periods of Taylor rule deviations. Indeed, the results of
Carvalho and Nechio (2014) support this conjecture. Furthermore, as can be observed in
Figure 1, the share of consumers consistent with the Taylor rule starts to drop also in our
analysis in August 2003–December 2005.21 We further analyze this issue in our regression
analysis.
3 Central Bank Communication, News, and Consis-
tency of Expectations
In this section, we analyze the impact of central bank communication and news on the
consistency of consumers’ expectations. The focus of the analysis lies hence on the ques-
tion if and how communication and news aﬀect consumers’ consistency. This is highly
relevant, since having a sound understanding of monetary policy increases the eﬀectiveness
of monetary policy making.
We test three diﬀerent parts of the central bank communication channel: We distin-
guish between the sender channel (central bank announcement), the transmission channel
(the volume of news in the media), and the receiver channel of news (consumers’ reported
perception of news). The main motivation for this is that both the transmission and the
receiver channel can be muted: The media tend to report “speciﬁc” news, and people have
limited information-processing capacities and therefore devote only a limited amount of
time to economic news. All these can substantially compromise the eﬀectiveness of the
communication strategies by the central bank. In particular, Hamilton (2004) and Soroka
(2006) report that the media report more “bad” news than “good” news and Sims (2003)
points out that people have a ﬁnite Shannon capacity to process information. Further-
more, Sims (2010) discusses the role of central bank communication and transparency
from the perspective of rational inattention and argues that ﬁnancial market participants
(and professional forecasters) are likely to be very attentive to central bank policy state-
ments. If the central bank is relatively vague, professional forecasters will make their own
assumptions and estimate the most likely path of actions. However, consumers may react
very diﬀerently than professional forecasters, paying less attention to policy announce-
ments and possibly reacting with a delay.
21In addition, in 1995/6 the correlation between the interest-rates of long maturity (lending rates) and
the 3-month Treasury Bill dropped considerably and corresponding to that we observe a fall in consistency
levels for the Taylor rule.
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This leads us to expect diﬀerent eﬀects of central bank communication on consumers
and professional forecasters. The sender channel may be more important for professionals
than for consumers: While for professionals it is plausible to expect that every com-
munication milestone discussed in this paper should improve the understanding of the
FOMC actions and thus the understanding of how the economy works, or at least have
a non-negative eﬀect, it is not obvious that the same is true for consumers. Additional
information can be confusing or understood with error. Thus, especially for consumers,
we would have a prior that the transmission channel (the role of media) plays a relatively
more important role and that the sender channel may play a smaller role. However, cer-
tain communication milestones, such as the announcement of an inﬂation target, should
be relevant also for consumers. The transmission channel from media news should be of
lower relevance for professionals. However, we could observe signiﬁcant eﬀects if the re-
sponse of professionals’ consistency is correlated with the media echo. In this respect, an
important milestone for professionals was the introduction of the press conferences after
every other FOMC meeting (the ones that are paired with the survey of economic pro-
jections), where they can hear additional explanations and clariﬁcations of policy actions
and forward guidance.
For consumers, we also have the data to test the receiver channel. Furthermore, we
can distinguish between perceived positive and negative news. Similarly to the case of
media reporting, and in line with the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
agents tend to display higher receptiveness towards “bad” news than “good” news. This
leads us to expect that there may be asymmetries in the eﬀect of positive and negative
news.22
3.1 Results for Consumers
To evaluate the eﬀects of communication on consistency of consumers, we estimate probit
models on the individual probability of forming theory-consistent expectations regarding
the Income Fisher equation, the Phillips curve, the Taylor rule, as well as for all three
macroeconomic relations simultaneously. Tables 7-9 report marginal eﬀects for our set of
determinants. To enhance comparability across models, all marginal eﬀects are evaluated
at a hypothetical “representative” consumer which we take to be male, white, 40 years
old, married, with a medium level of education and income, and living in the Northcentral
region of the U.S. All models additionally include a wide range of demographic controls
including interaction terms thereof. Robust standard errors are calculated with the δ
method (Oehlert, 1992). Additionally, we control for macroeconomic variables such as
22Figures A.4 and A.5 in the Appendix display the evolution of the relative volume of media news and
of the share of consumers reporting that they have heard news on a speciﬁc topic. Table A.7 presents a
correlation table between all the communication measures. Additionally, we test for Granger causality
between the diﬀerent news measures, shown in Table A.8 in the Appendix. We ﬁnd that media news
typically Granger-causes the perceptions of news by consumers.
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inﬂation, oil prices, and the unemployment gap as a measure of the business cycle, where
all price variables are included with one lag to account for a publication lag.
We thus specify a binary response model. The following variable is deﬁned:
zi,t =
{
1 if z∗i,t > 0
0 if z∗i,t ≤ 0
, i = 1, 2, ..., N, (5)
where z∗i,t is the latent variable that accounts for consumers’ theory-consistent expecta-
tions. Its discrete counterpart, zi,t, takes value one if the i
th respondent formed theory-
consistent expectations in period t, and zero otherwise. The following latent process is
assumed:
z∗i,t = α1 + ytα2 + ct/i,tα3 + xi,tα4 + ui,t, (6)
where α1 is a constant, yt is the vector of macroeconomic variables, ct/i,t is a vector
of communication variables, xi,t is a vector of socio-demographic characteristics (namely
gender, age, income, education, race, marital status, location in the US and interaction
terms between gender and education, race and region, as well as income and marital
status) and ui,t is normally distributed. We derive the marginal partial eﬀects from the
estimation of Pr(zi,t= 1|hi,t) = Φ (hi,tξ), where Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal
distribution, hi,t is the vector of covariates and ξ is a vector of coeﬃcients.
The MS contains single survey interviews as well as interviews within the rotating
panel. As some consumers are not selected to be interviewed a second time, this might
lead to a sample bias. Moreover, additional sample selection might arise from non-response
bias, which might be higher for speciﬁc demographic groups.23 We therefore account for
possible attrition both with respect to non-response and with respect to being selected
into the rotating panel and estimate all models with a Heckman correction. Our selection
variable thus takes on the value of one for second interviews within the rotating panel,
conditional on response to the question on quantitative inﬂation expectations.24 Sample
selection will only bias the estimates if the error terms of the outcome and of the selection
equation are signiﬁcantly correlated as measured by the parameter ρ. Overall, sample
selection seems to have relatively small eﬀects in our models since a Wald test frequently
cannot reject ρ = 0.
First, we test for an impact of changes in the communication strategy of the Fed on
consumers’ likelihood of forming consistent expectations.25 We thus incorporate a set of
23Speciﬁcally, we evaluate non-response to the question on quantitative inﬂation expectations. We
argue that this question might be perceived as being more demanding than the qualitative questions and,
thus, more prone to non-response.
24Note that our Heckman probit estimates thus eﬀectively account for only second interviews within
the rotating panel.
25We also tested for an eﬀect of the Chairmen of the Federal Reserve Board by including a dummy
variable for the term of Greenspan, with Bernanke’s term as reference period. While most results regard-
ing central bank communication remain robust, the results suggest an additional positive eﬀect of the
Greenspan period on consistency with the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule. The results are available
upon request.
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Table 7: Consistency and Central Bank Communication
Income Fisher eq. Phillips curve Taylor rule All Relations
πt−1 0.0031 0.0002 -0.0500*** -0.0087**
(0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0035)
σ2π,t−1 -0.0011 0.0024 -0.0104** 0.0024
(0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0041) (0.0031)
oilt−1 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003*** -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ugapt -0.0073*** 0.001 -0.0096* -0.0072
(0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0052) (0.0067)
FFTarget94t -0.0111 0.0270*** -0.0730*** -0.0038
(0.0072) (0.0085) (0.0102) (0.0070)
BalanceofRisk00t 0.0148* -0.0416*** 0.0434*** 0.0081
(0.0076) (0.0133) (0.0155) (0.0174)
V otes02t 0.0046 0.0019 -0.0044 0.013
(0.0104) (0.0126) (0.0147) (0.0095)
ForwardGuidance03t 0.0296*** -0.0378*** -0.0379*** -0.0241*
(0.0089) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0130)
PressConference11t 0.0164 -0.0148 – –
(0.0127) (0.0159)
ExplicitTarget12t 0.1194*** 0.0194 – –
(0.0159) (0.0585)
N 75,154 76,659 61,096 59,661
χ2 735.731 310.694 391.002 1332.859
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ -0.914 0.19 -0.122 -0.439
p-value Wald (ρ=0, χ2) 0.000 0.629 0.680 0.394
Notes: Table 7 reports the marginal partial eﬀects from the heckprobit models evaluated at the repre-
sentative consumer. The time sample is 1987m8-2012m9 for the Income Fisher equation and the Phillips
curve and 1987m8-2007m12 for the Taylor rule and all three relations jointly. The Wald test for ρ = 0
gives the χ2 statistics of the Wald test for independence from the sample selection equation. Robust stan-
dard errors are calculated with the δ method (Oehlert 1992) and are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗
indicates signiﬁcance at the 1/5/10% level.
monthly time dummy variables representing important milestones in the communication
strategy of the Fed, as deﬁned in section 2.1.26 Results are presented in Table 7.
Overall, changes in central bank communication aﬀect consumers’ consistency regard-
ing all macroeconomic relations analyzed here. We ﬁnd a positive link between the publica-
tion of the Federal Funds target rate in February 1994 on consumers’ individual likelihood
of being consistent with the Phillips curve, while the publication of the balance-of-risks
statement in January 2000 coincides with improvements in consistency regarding both
the Income Fisher equation and the Taylor rule. The latter eﬀect is quantitatively par-
ticularly important for consistency with the Taylor rule, which is plausible considering
26Middeldorp (2011) incorporates dummy variables in the same fashion to control for important mile-
stones of communication.
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that the statement speciﬁcally discusses the FOMC’s views on risks regarding its dual
mandate of inﬂation and business cycle stabilization. Additionally, the introduction of
forward guidance in August 2003 and of the explicit inﬂation target in January 2012 are
found to impact positively on consistency with the Income Fisher equation. Given that
the eﬀect of the explicit inﬂation target has to be seen relative to the introduction of
the communication measures beforehand, this result is remarkable in terms of size and
signiﬁcance. Note that due to the restrictions regarding the appropriate time sample, we
do not analyze this eﬀect for the Taylor rule.
Our results suggest also some negative links between central bank communication and
consumers’ consistency, stemming for instance from the balance of risks on consistency
with the Phillips curve and from the introduction of forward guidance on consistency with
both the Phillips curve and the Taylor rule. As there is no consensus on the optimal way
of central bank communication, it is not surprising that we observe also negative eﬀects.
The former eﬀect could point towards diﬃculties consumers have in inferring the Phillips
curve trade-oﬀ from the Fed’s risk assessment, while the latter could imply that consumers
perceived that the Fed was deviating from the rule. Indeed, the period between August
2003 – December 2005, according to Taylor (2007) and Carvalho and Nechio (2014), can
be considered as a period where the Fed deviated from a Taylor rule.
In addition to the communication eﬀects on consistency, the results in Table 7 imply
that especially consistency regarding the Taylor rule is aﬀected signiﬁcantly by macroe-
conomic price developments. It seems that in periods with both a higher level and higher
volatility of inﬂation, consumers are less likely to anticipate monetary policy reactions
in terms of a simple Taylor rule, while an increase in oil price growth has the opposite
eﬀect.27 Moreover, the unemployment gap is negatively linked to consistency with the
Income Fisher equation and the Taylor rule.
Next, we evaluate the eﬀect of media news on macroeconomic and monetary policy
issues on consumers’ consistency, while controlling for both central bank communication
and macroeconomic variables. Thus, we are assessing the importance of the transmission
channel. The results in Table 8 show that most of the communication eﬀects remain
robust, while a number of additional news eﬀects emerge, especially on consistency with
the Taylor rule, but also on other deﬁnitions of consistency. Most importantly, the results
show a positive link between media news on monetary policy issues and consumers’ consis-
tency with both the Income Fisher equation and the Taylor rule. This result suggests that
the central bank may aﬀect the formation of consumers’ expectations also indirectly via
a media communication channel. Interestingly, media reports on changes in the Federal
Funds rate per se have no impact on consistency with either of the relations. Regarding
27Additionally, we check whether consumers might have their “personal”CPI in mind when they answer
questions about prices, which we calculate from demographic-speciﬁc CPIs calculated by the Chicago
Fed (McGranahan and Paulson, 2005). Notably, the diﬀerences between general CPI and personal CPI
inﬂation are generally quite small. Incorporating personal CPI inﬂation as a control variable in the
regression gives virtually unchanged results.
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Table 8: Consistency and Media News
Income Fisher eq. Phillips curve Taylor rule All Relations
media πt 0.0158 -0.0490*** -0.1475*** -0.0511**
(0.0108) (0.0146) (0.0154) (0.0244)
media ut -0.0258** 0.0212 0.0671** 0.0391*
(0.0129) (0.0174) (0.0275) (0.0220)
media FFRt 0.0191 -0.0756 -0.0541 -0.0982
(0.0544) (0.0656) (0.0833) (0.0656)
media monetarypolicyt 0.1464*** -0.0174 0.1821* 0.0944
(0.0530) (0.0747) (0.1088) (0.1142)
FFTarget94t -0.0144* 0.0282*** -0.0703*** -0.0019
(0.0074) (0.0087) (0.0109) (0.0079)
BalanceofRisk00t 0.0225** -0.0639*** -0.0206 -0.0165
(0.0089) (0.0130) (0.0151) (0.0106)
V otes02t 0.0048 0.0077 0.0192 0.0243**
(0.0109) (0.0134) (0.0149) (0.0115)
ForwardGuidance03t 0.0224** -0.0231* 0.0009 -0.0109
(0.0096) (0.0121) (0.0130) (0.0098)
PressConference11t 0.0211 -0.0232 – –
(0.0149) (0.0181)
ExplicitTarget12t 0.1263*** 0.0034 – –
(0.0176) (0.0595)
N 75,154 76,659 61,096 59,661
χ2 754.319 323.862 490.703 1156.684
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ -0.919 0.148 -0.168 -0.478
p-value Wald (ρ=0, χ2) 0.000 0.705 0.514 0.329
Notes: Table 8 reports the marginal partial eﬀects from the heckprobit models evaluated at the represen-
tative consumer. The time sample is 1987m8-2012m9 for the Fisher equation and the Phillips curve and
1987m8-2007m12 for the Taylor rule and all three relations jointly. The Wald test for ρ = 0 gives the χ2
statistics of the Wald test for independence from the sample selection equation. Robust standard errors
are calculated with the δ method (Oehlert 1992) and are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates
signiﬁcance at the 1/5/10% level.
the eﬀects of media news on macroeconomic variables, the results are in line with the
eﬀects of macroeconomic control variables in the case of the Taylor rule, as media news
on inﬂation also coincide with a lower likelihood of consistency. We ﬁnd a similar eﬀect
on consistency with the Phillips curve. Media news on inﬂation and unemployment af-
fect the Taylor rule consistency with opposite signs. While more news on unemployment
increases consistency, the negative eﬀect of media news on inﬂation can be interpreted as
follows: When media reporting on inﬂation is high, there are two reasons why the Tay-
lor rule consistency declines. First, consistency with the Phillips curve trade-oﬀ is lower
in these circumstances (as can be seen in Table 8) and second, consumers do not seem
to update their interest rate expectations consistently when the volatility of inﬂation is
25
Table 9: Consistency and News Heard by Consumers
Income Fisher eq. Phillips curve Taylor rule All Relations
news prices highi,t 0.0122 -0.0634*** -0.0520*** -0.0184
(0.0088) (0.0150) (0.0128) (0.0148)
news prices lowi,t 0.026 0.0305 0.0485* 0.0323*
(0.0188) (0.0214) (0.0251) (0.0177)
news u highi,t 0.0213*** -0.0528*** -0.0481*** -0.0241**
(0.0055) (0.0101) (0.0079) (0.0108)
news u lowi,t -0.0439*** 0.0319 0.0458** 0.0015
(0.0082) (0.0195) (0.0194) (0.0225)
news credit tighti,t 0.0067 -0.0235 -0.1232*** -0.0582*
(0.0105) (0.0189) (0.0145) (0.0312)
news credit easyi,t -0.0257** 0.0249 -0.0088 -0.0294
(0.0109) (0.0238) (0.0201) (0.0323)
FFTarget94t -0.0108 0.0286*** -0.0684*** -0.0022
(0.0072) (0.0088) (0.0108) (0.0079)
BalanceofRisk00t 0.0104 -0.0299* 0.0556*** 0.0181
(0.0078) (0.0178) (0.0142) (0.0231)
V otes02t 0.0049 -0.0015 -0.013 0.0081
(0.0104) (0.0135) (0.0148) (0.0119)
ForwardGuidance03t 0.0322*** -0.0401*** -0.0367*** -0.0266**
(0.0090) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0117)
PressConference11t 0.0192 -0.0226 – –
(0.0127) (0.0170)
ExplicitTarget12t 0.1219*** 0.0334 – –
(0.0161) (0.0766)
N 75,154 76,659 61,096 59,661
χ2 787.065 419.705 549.685 1030.051
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ -0.908 0.083 -0.239 -0.591
p-value Wald (ρ=0, χ2) 0.000 0.865 0.432 0.264
Notes: Table 9 reports the marginal partial eﬀects from the heckprobit models evaluated at the represen-
tative consumer. The time sample is 1987m8-2012m9 for the Fisher equation and the Phillips curve and
1987m8-2007m12 for the Taylor rule and all three relations jointly. The Wald test for ρ = 0 gives the χ2
statistics of the Wald test for independence from the sample selection equation. Robust standard errors
are calculated with the δ method (Oehlert 1992) and are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates
signiﬁcance at the 1/5/10% level.
high (as can be seen in Table 7), which typically coincides with a higher media coverage
on inﬂation. Overall, we can say that consumer opinions and consistency with various
economic concepts is importantly shaped also by the transmission channel.
Finally, we also account for the eﬀect of central bank communication via the news
channel from consumers’ receiver perspective. To do so, we construct individual dummy
variables measuring if the consumer recently observed news on high or low prices/ in-
ﬂation, on high or low unemployment and on easy or tight credit conditions. Table 9
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presents the results, where again the central bank communication eﬀects remain mainly
robust. As we can disentangle the news perceived by consumers into more negative and
more positive news, we observe an interesting asymmetric news eﬀect: Negative news on
high inﬂation, high unemployment and tight credit conditions are frequently linked with
negative eﬀects on consumers’ consistency regarding the Phillips curve and the Taylor
rule, while the reverse is true for positive news. This implies that not only the “trans-
portation” of both monetary and macroeconomic news to consumers aﬀects consistency,
but also their content. Again in line with the macroeconomic eﬀects observed in Table 7,
consumers are less likely to be consistent with the Taylor rule if they observed news on
high prices. Ehrmann et al. (2015) show that the correlation between perceived news on
price increases and inﬂation of retail gasoline prices is very high (0.63), thus one can ex-
pect that this type of news is perceived as a supply shock and therefore is not consistent
with the Phillips curve relationship and the Taylor rule. For the Income Fisher equa-
tion, the likelihood of consistency is higher with news on high unemployment and lower
if the consumers observed news on low unemployment or easy credit conditions. These
results further emphasize that it is important to communicate clearly with individuals,
especially when adverse shocks hit the economy. One of the implications of our results is
that the various transmission channels studied in this paper are to some degree comple-
mentary to one other, and thus policies that reinforce diﬀerent channels—such as press
conferences—may be particularly eﬀective in guiding expectations of economic agents.
3.2 Results for Professional Forecasters
To compare our results on consumers to those of professional forecasters, we check the
consistency of expectations also with respect to the SPF. Again, we restrict the sample to
start in 1987q4 to avoid distorting eﬀects from large monetary policy shocks, but include
the ZLB period after 2007 in our analysis of consistency with the Taylor rule, since the
SPF asks for quantitative expectations regarding 3-month Treasury bill rates, which are
highly correlated with the policy rate throughout.28
As the SPF consists of quantitative forecasts, we have to slightly adapt the deﬁnitions
of consistency in Section 2. To test for consistency with respect to the Fisher equation,
we employ forecasts related to GDP. Speciﬁcally, using forecasts of the level of one-year-
ahead nominal GDP and of the one-year-ahead GDP deﬂator, we deﬁne the implied
expected real GDP in both the current period and one year ahead. These two measures
are then used to deﬁne the “perceived” one-year-ahead real GDP growth that is then
compared with professionals’ answers for expected one-year-ahead real GDP growth. We
treat expectations to be consistent with the GDP Fisher equation if “perceived” GDP
growth is not more than 0.1 percentage point diﬀerent to their answer for the one-year-
ahead real GDP growth. A threshold has to be chosen for the SPF forecasts to account
28Excluding the ZLB period leads to qualitatively similar results.
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for rounding eﬀects. We ﬁnd that 84% of forecast in the SPF are consistent with this
deﬁnition.29 As expected, this share is substantially higher among professional forecasters
than for consumers.
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Note: Graphs present the shares of professional forecasters with consistent expectations, together with a
polynomial trend. Shaded areas denote recession periods as deﬁned by the NBER.
Table 10: Shares of Professional Forecasters with Consistent Expectations, SPF
Mean Median SD Min Max N
Fisher Equation 0.84 0.86 0.08 0.64 1.00 4,075
Phillips Curve 0.51 0.52 0.20 0.06 0.90 4,075
Taylor Rule 0.46 0.47 0.20 0.00 0.89 4,075
All Relations 0.31 0.29 0.18 0.00 0.81 4,075
Notes: The time sample is 1987q4-2015q1.
We deﬁne consistency with the Phillips curve and the Taylor rules in the same way
as for consumers, except that we take into account rounding for the relationships that
29This is a relatively“generous”threshold for professional forecasters: if we reduced it to 0.05 percentage
point, then the share of consistent expectations would drop from 0.84 to 0.73.
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Table 11: Consistency and Media News, SPF
GDP Fisher eq. Phillips curve Taylor rule All Relations
πt−1 -0.0038 -0.0475*** -0.0517*** -0.0329***
(0.0094) (0.0138) (0.0120) (0.0120)
σ2π,t−1 -0.0016 0.0105** -0.0148*** -0.0043
(0.0025) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0039)
oilt−1 0.0002 0.0016*** 0.0002 -0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
ugapt -0.0253* -0.0406** -0.0861*** -0.0581***
(0.0149) (0.0169) (0.0200) (0.0171)
media πt 0.0709** 0.2209*** -0.0694 0.0215
(0.0295) (0.0480) (0.0517) (0.0401)
media ut -0.0332 -0.3053*** -0.2520*** -0.2331***
(0.0326) (0.0409) (0.0496) (0.0463)
media FFRt 0.3723* -0.9363*** -0.4819** -0.3588
(0.1966) (0.2102) (0.2406) (0.2352)
media monetarypolicyt -0.2267 0.4465** 0.7287*** 0.7207***
(0.1788) (0.1840) (0.2250) (0.1981)
FFTarget94t -0.0507 -0.2524*** -0.2082*** -0.2226***
(0.0353) (0.0479) (0.0451) (0.0413)
BalanceofRisk00t 0.0448* 0.1906*** 0.0136 0.0629*
(0.0249) (0.0461) (0.0422) (0.0381)
V otes02t -0.0119 -0.1792*** -0.0351 0.0220
(0.0245) (0.0598) (0.0541) (0.0476)
ForwardGuidance03t 0.0404 -0.0786 -0.0428 -0.0739*
(0.0397) (0.0518) (0.0525) (0.0444)
PressConference11t 0.0615 0.3769*** 0.2810*** 0.2049***
(0.0481) (0.0670) (0.0673) (0.0665)
ExplicitTarget12t 0.0601 -0.0676 -0.0825 -0.0288
(0.0579) (0.0636) (0.0702) (0.0634)
N 3630 3712 3500 3320
χ2 22.134 139.987 148.645 111.038
Notes: Table 11 reports the average marginal eﬀects from the population average panel probit models.
The time sample is 1987q4-2015q1. Robust standard errors are calculated with the δ method (Oehlert
1992) and are reported in parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 1/5/10% level.
include equality, as in the case of the Fisher equation.30 We ﬁnd that on average 51%
of forecasts are consistent with the Phillips curve and 46% of all forecasts are consistent
with the Taylor rule. While there are more forecasts consistent with the Phillips curve for
professional forecasters, the share of consistent forecasts with the Taylor rule is remarkably
close to the one by consumers. However, 31% of all forecasts are consistent with all three
principles, which is substantially higher than 6% in the case of consumers.
30As our Taylor rule deﬁnition includes a period when interest rates are at their eﬀective zero lower
bound, we do a robustness check where we explicitly take into account this constraint in our deﬁnition
of consistency. The zero lower bound constraint aﬀects only about 1% of all forecasts in the post 2009q1
period. All aﬀected forecasts are between 2009–2010.
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Regarding the time variation of these shares, there are several regularities that can
be seen in Figure 5. The share of forecasts consistent with the GDP Fisher equation is
relatively stable and does not exhibit as much volatility as the other shares. There is a
small decrease of the share of consistent expectations in the second half of the 1990’s. It
is also evident that the share always decreases just before or at the beginning of reces-
sions (around the turning points). The other three shares display very similar cyclical
properties. They all feature a drop in the share of consistent expectations during the last
recession. The share of consistent forecasts peaks one or two years after the ﬁrst two re-
cessions in our sample, however after the last recession we again observe increasing levels
of consistency. In the last 2 quarters of our sample, the share of consistent expectations
with all three principles reached around 80% of all forecasts.
The microdata of the SPF contains a larger panel dimension than the MS, but does
not report any demographic characteristics. Therefore, we cannot account for attrition,
but instead estimate panel probit models for the individual likelihood of consistency and
report average marginal eﬀects. The eﬀects of the macroeconomic control variables on
professionals’ consistency are mostly in line with our results for consumers. Here, we
additionally ﬁnd that consistency with the Phillips curve is less likely with higher inﬂation
or a higher unemployment gap, in line with the eﬀect on the Taylor rule.
Regarding the sender channel of central bank communication, two communication
milestones stand out: The consistency of professional forecasters in the SPF signiﬁcantly
improved with the introduction of the balance of risk in January 2000 and with the press
conference in April 2011. The latter eﬀect is especially plausible, as it adds additional clar-
iﬁcation and interpretation to the FOMC’s decision. By contrast, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
eﬀect of the publication of the inﬂation target in January 2012 on professionals’ consis-
tency, which may mean that the target was already incorporated into their forecasts. We
also ﬁnd that some communication milestones have negative eﬀects on consistency with
various macroeconomic concepts, where especially the announcement of the Federal Funds
target in February 1994 stands out. Again, as noted earlier, it is not clear that all means
of communication necessarily improve the understanding of monetary policy.
Somewhat surprisingly, the results show more signiﬁcant eﬀects of media reports on
professionals’ consistency compared to consumers. It thus seems that changes in pro-
fessionals’ consistency are at least correlated with the intensity of media news. In line
with our result for consumers, we ﬁnd a positive link between media reports on monetary
policy and professionals’ consistency with the Taylor rule. With the exception of some
positive eﬀects of news on inﬂation and news on the Federal Funds rate on consistency




Consumers’ and professional forecasters’ macroeconomic expectations are of key relevance
for central banks’ policy decisions and, hence, for macroeconomic outcomes. While many
papers have investigated the properties of expectations of individual series in depth, there
is almost no evidence on whether expectations on several macroeconomic aggregates are
formed consistent with important economic concepts. This is, however, an important
issue as the eﬃciency of monetary policy strongly depends on the understanding of the
implication of central bank actions.
This paper ﬁrst calculates the share of both consumers and professional forecasters
that have expectations in line with the Fisher equation, the Phillips curve, and the Taylor
rule. Second, we evaluate the implication of having consistent expectations by looking at
forecast accuracy and investigate whether communication can help facilitate the under-
standing of monetary policy and thereby increase the share of people having consistent
expectations. We link consistency to three diﬀerent channels of central bank communi-
cation: the sender channel (central bank announcements), the transmission channel (the
volume of news in the media), and the receiver channel of news (consumers’ reported
perception of news). Speciﬁcally, we propose consistency as a measure for assessing the
eﬀectiveness of central bank communication.
While the share of professional forecasters with consistent expectations is generally
found to be higher than the corresponding share for consumers, both groups show a
similar time-variation in their degree of consistency. Part of this time-variation can be
related to the communication channels. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that both consumers’ and
professional forecasters’ consistency improves with certain changes in the communication
strategy of the FOMC. While consumers were mostly aﬀected by the announcement of
the Federal Funds Target rate in February 1994, the introduction of the balance-of-risks
statement in January 2000 and the introduction of the oﬃcial inﬂation target in January
2012, professionals’ consistency gained particularly from the introduction of the press
conference after the FOMC meetings in April 2011. Moreover, both the transmission
and the receiver channel play an important role. Our results suggest that consistency of
both groups beneﬁts from media news on monetary policy, reiterating the importance of
the media in focusing attention on these topics and in clarifying the FOMC’s decisions.
Looking at the receiver channel for consumers, we ﬁnd evidence that especially negative
news impair the probability of having consistent expectations.
Overall, our results suggest that central bank communication can increase the extent
to which people form expectations consistent with key economic concepts. Furthermore,
having consistent expectations helps predict economic outcomes with a higher accuracy.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Additional Robustness Checks
We conduct some robustness checks. First, we control for a potential eﬀect of the ZLB
period for consumers’ consistency with the Taylor rule, and second we check for eﬀects of
demand and supply shocks as identiﬁed by Kilian (2009).
Table A.1 comprises the results for consistency with the Taylor rule when the estima-
tion sample is extended to include the ZLB period after 2007. We control for additional
eﬀects from this period with a dummy, which takes on the value of one from 2008m1 on-
wards. In the ﬁrst column, the ZLB dummy accounts only for level shifts in consistency,
while the second column estimates also interaction terms with our macroeconomic deter-
minants. Notably, in both models the eﬀects of both the macroeconomic determinants
and of the central bank communication variables remain robust with respect to our results
for the reduced time sample. Hence, it seems that the lower correlation between interest
rates at short and long maturities during the ZLB period does not overthrow any of our
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main results. Additionally, the level ZLB dummy is not signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst column.
Nevertheless, accounting for interaction terms with the macroeconomic variables, we ﬁnd
a number of signiﬁcant eﬀects. As expected, the results suggest that overall consistency
was lower during the ZLB period, where the negative eﬀect of inﬂation is reduced, but
the negative eﬀect of a higher unemployment gap is reinforced. Considering that this was
the most severe recession during our time sample, these results are quite plausible. While
all central bank communication eﬀects on consistency with the Taylor rule stay robust,
extending the sample yields additional positive links between communication eﬀorts and
consistency: The introduction of the press conference has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect in
both models, while the model with interaction terms also yields a signiﬁcantly positive
eﬀect from the introduction of the oﬃcial inﬂation target. The former eﬀect is in line
with our results for professional forecasters, while the latter eﬀect suggests that contrary
to professionals, consumers did not previously completely incorporate the inﬂation target
in their expectation formation.
Lastly, we check whether demand and supply shocks hitting the economy have an
eﬀect on consistency, as shown in Table A.2. As discussed in section 2.3, especially large
supply shocks could aﬀect consumers’ consistency with the Phillips curve. To check for
the robustness of our main estimation results, we re-estimate the models with macroe-
conomic determinants and central bank communication in Table 7 with the dummy for
predominant demand shocks (demdominant) used in Figure 4.31 We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
eﬀects of the shocks on consistency with either the Income Fisher equation, the Phillips
curve, or the Taylor rule. All eﬀects from the macroeconomic determinants and central
bank communication remain robust.
31Since the time series in Kilian (2009) run only until 2007m12, we cannot check for robustness of the
eﬀects from introducing a press conference in April 2011 and the explicit inﬂation target in January 2012.
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Table A.1: Robustness Check: Accounting for the Eﬀect of the Zero Lower Bound Period
on Consistency with the Taylor Rule
Taylor rule Taylor rule
level dummy interaction terms
































Demographic Controls Yes Yes
ρ -0.216 -0.185
p-value Wald (ρ=0, χ2) 0.346 0.385
Notes: The dummy d zlb takes on the value of 1 from 2008m1
onwards, when the ﬁnancial crisis hit and interest rates converged
to the ZLB. Table A.1 reports the marginal partial eﬀects from the
heckprobit models evaluated at the representative consumer. The
time sample for the estimations is 1987m8-2012m9. The Wald test
for ρ = 0 gives the χ2 statistics of the Wald test for independence
from the sample selection equation. Robust standard errors are
calculated with the δ method (Oehlert 1992) and are reported in
parentheses. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table A.2: Robustness Check: Accounting for the Eﬀect of Demand and Supply Shocks
Income Fisher eq. Phillips curve Taylor rule All Three
πt−1 0.0078** -0.0005 -0.0501*** -0.0089**
(0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0035)
σ2π,t−1 -0.0008 0.0174*** -0.0103** 0.0025
(0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0041) (0.0032)
oilt−1 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003*** -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ugapt -0.0074** -0.0024 -0.0096* -0.0073
(0.0032) (0.0062) (0.0052) (0.0069)
demdominantt 0.0028 0.0042 -0.0021 -0.0032
(0.0041) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0037)
FFTarget94t -0.0046 0.0305*** -0.0727*** -0.0034
(0.0081) (0.0104) (0.0102) (0.0071)
BalanceofRisk00t 0.0131* -0.0410** 0.0433*** 0.0085
(0.0078) (0.0170) (0.0155) (0.0181)
V otes02t 0.0092 -0.0037 -0.0046 0.0127
(0.0112) (0.0149) (0.0147) (0.0097)
ForwardGuidance03t 0.0221** -0.0378*** -0.0379*** -0.0245*
(0.0099) (0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0131)
N 60074 61404 61096 59661
χ2 422.452 189.614 391.128 1035.097
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
ρ -0.929 0.002 -0.123 -0.457
p-value Wald (ρ=0, χ2) 0.000 0.996 0.677 0.379
Notes: The time series for demand and supply shocks are taken from Kilian (2009) and cover the
time period 1978m1-2007m12. The dummy variable demdominant takes on the value of one in
time periods where demand shocks are larger than supply shocks in absolute terms. Table A.2
reports the marginal partial eﬀects from the heckprobit models evaluated at the representative
consumer. The time sample for the estimations is 1987m8-2007m12. The Wald test for ρ = 0 gives
the χ2 statistics of the Wald test for independence from the sample selection equation. Robust
standard errors are calculated with the δ method (Oehlert 1992) and are reported in parentheses.
∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates signiﬁcance at the 1/5/10% level.
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6.2 Additional Graphs and Tables





























Note: philu combined (taylu combined) gives the baseline share of consumers consistent with the Phillips
curve (Taylor rule), where inﬂation expectations are deﬁned from both the quantitative question [A12b],
compared to a rounded average of actual inﬂation over the previous 12 months, and the qualitative
question [A12] as discussed in the paper. Philu quant (taylu quant) uses the identiﬁcation of inﬂa-
tion expectations from only the quantitative question [A12b] as in Carvalho and Nechio (2014), where
quantitative point estimates are compared to a rounded average of actual inﬂation over the previous 12
months. Philu qual (taylu qual) is derived using only qualitative inﬂation expectations from question
[A12]. Philu consdiff (taylu consdiff) identiﬁes expected inﬂation changes by comparing the quanti-
tative inﬂation forecasts between the second and the ﬁrst interview in the rotating panel. Shaded areas
denote recession periods as deﬁned by the NBER.
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Figure A.2: Consistency with the Taylor Rule when Inﬂation Expectations are Evaluated










1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Baseline
with Quantitative Inflation Expectations Above/Below 2%
Shares of Consistent Taylor Rule Expectations
Note: Shaded areas denote recession periods as deﬁned by the NBER.













1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Random−Walk Expectations
Non−Random−Walk Expectations
Consistency with the Phillips Curve
Note: Shaded areas denote recession periods as deﬁned by the NBER.
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Table A.3: Shares of Consumers with Consistent Expectations Regarding the Income
Fisher Equation
Mean Median SD Min Max N T-test K-W Test
Mean Median
All 0.52 0.51 0.04 0.41 0.64 152,041 – –
Male 0.54 0.54 0.05 0.40 0.67 67,838 -14.746*** 162.654***
Female 0.50 0.49 0.05 0.37 0.64 84,199 14.746*** 162.630***
Age young 0.47 0.48 0.06 0.26 0.61 37,280 16.738*** 209.464***
Age middle 0.52 0.52 0.04 0.41 0.66 60,580 -2.519** 4.767**
Age old 0.54 0.54 0.06 0.39 0.69 53,614 -12.760*** 121.829***
Educ1 0.47 0.46 0.17 0.00 1.00 5,016 5.415*** 21.985***
Educ2 0.46 0.47 0.12 0.13 0.85 8,356 8.559*** 54.833***
Educ3 0.48 0.48 0.06 0.34 0.73 44,619 15.647*** 183.110***
Educ4 0.51 0.51 0.06 0.33 0.68 37,655 2.556** 4.875**
Educ5 0.54 0.54 0.06 0.36 0.72 34,089 -9.085*** 61.792***
Educ6 0.58 0.58 0.06 0.43 0.74 21,468 -19.372*** 280.359***
Inc quint1 0.50 0.50 0.08 0.24 0.69 22,492 4.382*** 14.376***
Inc quint2 0.51 0.51 0.07 0.29 0.72 25,699 0.934 0.653
Inc quint3 0.51 0.50 0.07 0.31 0.72 29,171 3.168*** 7.541***
Inc quint4 0.51 0.51 0.06 0.36 0.73 32,941 3.516*** 9.257***
Inc quint5 0.54 0.54 0.05 0.37 0.71 33,749 -10.639*** 84.709***
West 0.52 0.52 0.06 0.32 0.67 30,692 -2.066** 3.209*
North central 0.52 0.52 0.06 0.34 0.68 40,423 -2.030** 3.086*
Northeast 0.52 0.52 0.06 0.35 0.70 29,180 0.014 -0.005
South 0.51 0.51 0.06 0.39 0.69 51,746 3.649*** 9.960***
Notes: The time sample is 1987m8-2012m9. The last two columns present tests for equality of
means (medians) between a particular subsample indicated in the ﬁrst column and the rest of the
sample. For the mean we employ a two-sample mean-comparison t-test with equal variances and
for the median a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates signiﬁcance
at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table A.4: Shares of Consumers with Consistent Expectations Regarding the Phillips
Curve
Mean Median SD Min Max N T-test K-W Test
Mean Median
All 0.34 0.34 0.05 0.16 0.44 152,041 – –
Male 0.34 0.35 0.05 0.17 0.45 67,838 -4.036*** 10.913***
Female 0.33 0.33 0.05 0.15 0.47 84,199 4.032*** 10.913***
Age young 0.36 0.36 0.06 0.16 0.53 37,280 -10.580*** 75.129***
Age middle 0.33 0.34 0.05 0.16 0.46 60,580 2.188** 3.238*
Age old 0.32 0.32 0.06 0.14 0.48 53,614 7.344*** 36.209***
Educ1 0.33 0.33 0.15 0.00 1.00 5,016 0.834 0.469
Educ2 0.33 0.32 0.11 0.00 0.60 8,356 1.879* 2.348
Educ3 0.33 0.33 0.06 0.16 0.51 44,619 1.456 1.432
Educ4 0.33 0.33 0.06 0.13 0.50 37,655 3.482*** 8.124***
Educ5 0.35 0.35 0.06 0.16 0.52 34,089 -4.834*** 15.688***
Educ6 0.34 0.35 0.07 0.13 0.54 21,468 -1.866* 2.348
Inc quint1 0.32 0.32 0.07 0.15 0.57 22,492 6.731*** 30.447***
Inc quint2 0.32 0.32 0.07 0.14 0.59 25,699 5.939*** 23.671***
Inc quint3 0.33 0.33 0.07 0.09 0.52 29,171 3.293*** 7.290***
Inc quint4 0.35 0.35 0.07 0.11 0.50 32,941 -4.978*** 16.672***
Inc quint5 0.36 0.36 0.06 0.16 0.55 33,749 -8.741*** 51.321***
West 0.34 0.34 0.07 0.16 0.53 30,692 0.654 0.331
North central 0.34 0.34 0.06 0.13 0.54 40,423 -0.700 0.331
Northeast 0.34 0.34 0.07 0.14 0.49 29,180 -0.820 0.467
South 0.34 0.34 0.05 0.15 0.49 51,746 0.782 0.422
Notes: The time sample is 1987m8-2012m9. The last two columns present tests for equality of
means (medians) between a particular subsample indicated in the ﬁrst column and the rest of the
sample. For the mean we employ a two-sample mean-comparison t-test with equal variances and
for the median a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates signiﬁcance
at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table A.5: Shares of Consumers with Consistent Expectations Regarding the Taylor Rule
Mean Median SD Min Max N T-test K-W Test
Mean Median
All 0.46 0.46 0.06 0.29 0.61 123,324 – –
Male 0.46 0.45 0.07 0.27 0.65 55,377 -0.386 0.112
Female 0.46 0.46 0.07 0.28 0.61 67,943 0.376 0.112
Age young 0.45 0.45 0.07 0.22 0.65 33,932 3.228*** 7.770***
Age middle 0.46 0.46 0.07 0.30 0.63 50,537 -0.009 0.007
Age old 0.47 0.47 0.08 0.27 0.64 38,380 -2.998*** 6.681***
Educ1 0.44 0.44 0.16 0.00 1.00 4,444 2.158** 3.458*
Educ2 0.43 0.43 0.12 0.16 0.80 7,205 4.248*** 13.428***
Educ3 0.45 0.45 0.07 0.28 0.62 37,378 2.049** 3.139*
Educ4 0.45 0.45 0.07 0.29 0.63 29,325 1.420 1.507
Educ5 0.47 0.47 0.08 0.23 0.68 27,516 -3.207*** 7.645***
Educ6 0.47 0.47 0.10 0.20 0.70 16,690 -4.237*** 13.357***
Inc quint1 0.44 0.44 0.08 0.19 0.74 17,836 3.941*** 11.567***
Inc quint2 0.45 0.46 0.07 0.23 0.63 20,519 1.629 1.971
Inc quint3 0.45 0.46 0.08 0.23 0.64 23,333 1.106 0.900
Inc quint4 0.45 0.45 0.09 0.23 0.66 27,225 2.084** 3.251*
Inc quint5 0.48 0.48 0.09 0.22 0.71 28,016 -7.545*** 42.325***
West 0.46 0.46 0.08 0.25 0.70 24,803 0.154 0.007
North central 0.46 0.46 0.07 0.25 0.64 32,697 -1.233 1.131
Northeast 0.46 0.46 0.08 0.23 0.67 23,684 -1.263 1.166
South 0.45 0.46 0.07 0.27 0.66 42,140 2.069** 3.168*
Notes: The time sample is 1987m8-2007m12. The last two columns present tests for equality of
means (medians) between a particular subsample indicated in the ﬁrst column and the rest of the
sample. For the mean we employ a two-sample mean-comparison t-test with equal variances and
for the median a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates signiﬁcance
at the 1/5/10% level.
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Table A.6: Shares of Consumers with Consistent Expectations for All Three Economic
Concepts
Mean Median SD Min Max N T-test K-W Test
Mean Median
All 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.12 123,324 – –
Male 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.16 55,377 -7.366*** 9.520***
Female 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.13 67,943 7.359*** 9.500***
Age young 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.18 33,932 2.855*** 1.437
Age middle 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.15 50,537 -0.273 0.002
Age old 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.18 38,380 -2.568** 1.165
Educ1 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.67 4,444 0.481 0.072
Educ2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.24 7,205 2.578*** 1.167
Educ3 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.17 37,378 7.153*** 8.953
Educ4 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.22 29,325 3.624*** 2.302
Educ5 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.18 27,516 -5.815*** 5.921***
Educ6 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.20 16,690 -8.484*** 12.592***
Inc quint1 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.19 17,836 1.656* 0.455
Inc quint2 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.14 20,519 5.108*** 4.532**
Inc quint3 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.15 23,333 1.736* 0.518
Inc quint4 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.16 27,225 1.877* 0.601
Inc quint5 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.17 28,016 -9.060*** 14.297***
West 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.15 24,803 0.470 0.041
North central 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.14 32,697 -1.273 0.293
Northeast 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.16 23,684 -0.615 0.080
South 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.16 42,140 1.302 0.274
Notes: The time sample is 1987m8-2007m12. The last two columns present tests for equality of
means (medians) between a particular subsample indicated in the ﬁrst column and the rest of the
sample. For the mean we employ a two-sample mean-comparison t-test with equal variances and
for the median a Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test. ∗∗∗/∗∗/∗ indicates signiﬁcance
at the 1/5/10% level.
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6.3 Analysis of News Variables
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(b) News on the Federal Funds Rate and Monetary Policy

























































(c) News on Credit Conditions
In the analysis shown in the Table A.8, we show that we can identify a pattern in the
direction of Granger causality between diﬀerent measures of news. As expected, we ﬁnd
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that media news typically Granger-causes the perceptions of news by consumers. The
only exception is perceived news on high inﬂation. However, we have to take into account
that perceived news on inﬂation mainly reﬂect consumer experiences with frequently pur-
chased items, where gasoline prices play a predominant role (see Ehrmann et al., 2015).
Regarding the sender channel, we can only assess whether speciﬁc communication mile-
stones have increased the level of news in the economy or the average perception of news.
Indeed, we see quite a few signiﬁcant eﬀects on both the share of consumers reporting
hearing news and also on the volume of media news. Especially the introduction of forward
guidance and of the press conferences increased the volume of media news signiﬁcantly,
while, as expected, the evidence is less clear-cut for the share of perceived news.32
32Results for tests on these relations are available upon request.
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